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THE SILENCE OF FEAR, 
SILENCING BY FEAR AND 
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Although the aim of this paper is primarily to provide a theoretical contribution to our 
understanding of silence, it is also based on an ethnographic study conducted in Lika, 
a region of Croatia marked by a history of conflict and violence. Silence, in addition 
to having diverse functions and effects, is also characterised by different durations (it 
can be measured in seconds as well as in decades). It can be, and often is, filled with 
other potentially communicable non-verbal aspects (emotions and affects, gestures, 
sounds, etc.). It can also be more or less dependent on – and even steered by – the 
opinions, experiences and viewpoints of other individuals and communities. In short, 
this paper deals with the silences found in the course of the research within the fra-
mework of numerous typologies of silence, focusing on contextually dependent and 
ambivalent effects of silence, its “emptiness”, duration and actors (both individuals and 
communities). This paper deals with silences and silencing at the macrolevel (which 
includes their affective and social functions), as well as their effect at the microlevel 
of interpersonal interaction, everyday life and fieldwork encounters. The effects of the 
network of silences on the public presentation of the findings resulting from studying 
silence will also be discussed.
Keywords: silence, fear, anxiety, typologies of silence, “emptiness” of silence, duration of 
silence, actors of silence
[M]ore suffering is lived through than is seen from the outside. It 
seems that mankind prefers to suffer in silence, prefers to live in the 
world of silence, even if it be by suffering, than to take its suffering 
into the loud places of history. (Picard 1964: 73)
[S]ilencing is […] in danger of being assimilated by its rival, language. 
(Thiesmeyer 2003a: 13)
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1. INTRODUCTION
Before1 I became interested in the concepts of silence, concealment, (self-)silencing and 
the state of being silenced, both as communicational phenomena and important factors 
in the transmission of knowledge and experience pertaining to the war and the post-war 
period, as well as constitutive elements of the affective atmosphere2 in which personal 
experience is lived and narrated, I was particularly interested in the forms through which 
and in which fear and anxiety are recounted. From the present perspective, the line leading 
from narrating fear to communication through silence seems to point to a logical and 
expected path of development; however, looking back, this journey was also emotional, 
curious and uncertain. Identifying, recording and studying silences related to different 
forms of intimidation and fear, trauma and anxiety constitutes a kind of “backdoor ap-
proach” (Seljamaa and Siim 2016) to the study of cultural, affective and narrative practices 
which make up the affective atmosphere of the war and post-war periods in Croatia, 
primarily at the level of narrated and narrative events, and their “audibility” in society as 
a whole. Therefore, silence can also be seen as a phenomenon which acts as a “window 
on the elusive and overt roots of power” (Achino-Loeb 2006a: 1), which means that it 
also enables access to that which is less visible and less accessible to the researcher at 
the cognitive level, but which is nonetheless strongly present in the affective realm. This 
paper deals with silences and silencing at the macrolevel (which includes their affective 
and social functions), as well as their effect at the microlevel of interpersonal interaction, 
everyday life and fieldwork encounters. The effects of the network of silences on the 
public presentation of the findings resulting from studying silence will also be discussed.
Although this paper primarily aims to provide a theoretical contribution to our under-
standing of silence, it is also based on a study conducted in Lika, a region of Croatia 
marked by a history of conflict and violence (World War II, the war of the 1990s).3 The 
fundamental hypothesis, elaborated over time, and the main reason for choosing this 
locality, is the fact that Lika, due to an “excess” of history marked by conflict and violence, 
represents a space of collective anxiety (cf. Marković 2018).4 
1 This article has been financed by the Croatian Science Foundation (“Narrating Fear: From Old Records 
to New Orality”, Project No IP-06-2016-2463).
2 For more on affective atmospheres, see Anderson 2009; Wetherell 2013; Michels 2015; for more on 
the affective atmosphere in Croatia and its effects, see Marković (2018a: 128–130). 
3 I conducted research in Lika on several occasions. Ivona Grgurinović, a colleague from the Department 
of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Zagreb, participated in two field studies in 2017. 
On one occasion, we were also joined by students Lorena Drakula, Dinko Duančić and Tijana Tadić. The same 
research was continued in 2019, when I spoke on two occasions with members of a family who had recently 
moved to Zagreb from the same part of Lika. I also talked to members of an association active in the same 
area (the registered office of the association has been left out).
4 Helmut Gaus (2003) believes that anxiety is a strictly individual matter. We can only speak of collective 
anxiety, Gaus claims, when “a large section of the population is threatened by the same disaster” (2003: 48). 
Collective anxiety presupposes that a member of the group is aware that other members of the same group 
are also anxious. It is often preceded by a period of collective fear with the same premise.
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The focus of my research was not the content of historical events, but rather the ways 
in which stories of these events are created, including the tension between the dominant 
narrative and other, “small” stories as well as that which remains unsaid in such accounts. 
“Small”, personal narratives are often emotionally intense, and they reflect the fear of nar-
rated and narrative events, as well as the fear which is a result of social tensions, silencing 
and elision. Therefore, rather than being assigned to verbalised and visual forms of knowl-
edge and information (even though these make up the majority of what is considered 
ethnographic material), priority is given to that which often remains outside of the grasp 
of the interpretative apparatus, to that which is experienced through the use of different 
senses and is interpreted in the emotional register, often remaining without its (adequate 
or expected) verbalised component. 
Narratives about fear and in fear (of violence) are difficult to study because one of their 
key components is silence in various forms, with different functions and effects on the 
conversation and the discursive and affective practices which make up the affective atmo-
sphere of the communities in which fear is created, processed, accumulated, reoriented, 
transmitted, communicated, changed and sometimes resolved, either through speech or 
silence. Silence, in addition to having diverse functions and effects, is also marked by 
different durations (it can be measured in seconds, as well as in decades). It can be, and 
often is, filled with other potentially communicable non-verbal aspects (emotions and af-
fects, gestures, sounds, etc.). It can also be more or less dependent on – and even steered 
by – the opinions, experiences and viewpoints of other individuals and communities. 
The realisation that silence is a frequent mode of communicating and concealing fear 
has motivated me to try to detect the conditions under which fear (acute fear, low-intensity 
fear and/or anxiety) can be recounted in the first place, which includes: the way fear is 
recounted in the field, in everyday communication, public discourse and academic texts. 
More specifically, in order to study the conditions under which fear and its effects can 
be narrated, I focused primarily on the places where there is an absence or reduction in 
verbalisation – where silence is the result of an intimidating object and/or intimidated 
subject, i.e. their “contact zone” (Ahmed 2014). I focused on the areas where narration 
cannot occur or is not desired, which does not necessarily mean that communication and 
a transfer of knowledge and personal experience were not realised in these instances.
The initial event which I consider decisive for my turn towards identifying, recording and 
thinking about fear through the practice of silence and omission took place in a village in Lika. 
THE PUB5
Marija is the owner of an eating establishment where we were taken by our gatekeeper, 
who is perceived as a person of trust by the local community and who, much like Marija, 
5 Examples were given titles for more convenient referencing later in the text.
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shared a similar wartime and post-war fate as a member of an ethnic minority. We spent 
more than two hours there. We tried to steer the conversation towards her “terrifying 
experience” (as described by some of her neighbours, and also the reason of our visit) 
a number of times, but she successfully avoided our attempts, choosing instead to talk 
about government grants, EU funds, the new kitchen she wanted to get and the furni-
ture she wanted to reupholster. In this specific situation, as in all similar ones, I (and my 
colleague) tried to keep autobiographical intrusions at a minimum, while also trying to 
respect the interlocutor’s implicit and explicit decisions and signals with regard to the 
management of the narrative content. The situation we found ourselves in would not have 
been as interesting if Marija had not embraced us tightly as we were leaving and thanked 
us repeatedly for coming and for being interested in her story (which remained untold). 
She was very emotional. Her eyes were full of tears. We interpreted her silence at that 
time as a method of exercising her right to her own story (through silence) and a means 
of establishing an intersubjective connection, strong empathy and affection between 
those participating in the conversation. Her gesture at our departure enabled us to see 
her silence as thematic.6 The content of that which remained unsaid is still unknown to us, 
even to this day; however, in the context of studying the narration of fear, this is of lesser 
importance. The thematic omission which manifested itself as “garrulous” silence was 
not without linguistic, situational and conversational significance, and was certainly not 
unimportant. It enabled interaction and the transmission of emotional intensity pertaining 
to an experience the exact constitutive events of which remain unknown. 
Muriel Saville-Troike points out that we cannot understand a communication system 
without taking into account the ways in which “silence serves variously as prime, sub-
stitute, and surrogate, as well as frame, cue, and background” within that system (1985: 
17). By analogy, I believe that individual and collective narratives created in fear or about 
fear, as well as the affective atmosphere in which fear is cultivated, processed, dismantled 
and communicated, cannot be understood without taking into consideration the practices 
of silence, omission and (self-)silencing. This statement should be given special atten-
tion because the studied group does not have “the privilege of explicitness, the luxury of 
transparency, the presumptive norm of clear and direct communication, free and open 
debate on a level playing field that privileged [groups] take for granted” (Conquergood 
2002: 146).
Fear and related emotions, and the various forms of silence resulting from them, are 
deeply embedded and present in almost all phases of scholarly inquiry in this area – from 
planning the research, theoretical positioning, fieldwork to presenting the results. This is 
a consequence of choosing to work with interlocutors who are members of an ethnic 
minority with which the majority group shares a long history of violence, conflict and life 
alongside each other. The original hypothesis that this was a locality brimming with fear, 
anxiety, trauma and a long history of related silences was justified by this fact.
6 For more on thematic silence, see Kurzon 2007.
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2. WHAT IS SILENCE: PART ONE
Language and silence belong together: language has knowledge 
of silence as silence has knowledge of language (Picard 1964: xx) 
TEARS
After a suggestion from the same gatekeeper who arranged our meeting with Marija, 
Lidija also agreed to meet us in a restaurant. We briefly described our intentions. Soon 
after that, we started recording the conversation. Sixteen minutes from the start of the 
recording, Lidija ended her war story in tears:
Jelena: And what did your departure from this place look like? 
Lidija: It is, and that would be the best way to describe it, a scream from your soul. 
[Crying] May it never happen again. You are abandoned by everyone. Pack what little 
you have, take your child and go. But go where? Into the night? To whom? You create a 
life for yourself and then they say you have to leave. Why? What did I ever do to deserve 
this? You can’t imagine living through it. 
NO WORDS
When Lidija was able to contain her tears, she remained silent for about thirty seconds, 
although it seemed to last much longer (my colleague and I also remained silent). She 
then continued to tearfully describe her experience in great detail. She would sometimes 
end the episodes she was describing with the following formulations:
Lidija: That night. Fear, terror, sadness, desperation. I don’t know if there is a word you 
could use to describe it.
Even though Lidija was a skilled storyteller, and even though she did not show any obvious 
inhibitions, she would often conclude her stories with similar expressions, suggesting that 
words were not enough to fully relate the experience. Nonetheless, she invested great 
effort into finding the “right” words and giving meaningful structure to the story.
THE WALK 
The day after describing her experience, Lidija took us for a walk through the abandoned 
village, which included a stop at the cemetery. We started recording the “tour” as soon as 
we met up. What little we did speak was not thematically related to her wartime experi-
ence. A lot of the information about the village and its devastation were communicated to 
168
NU 57/1, 2020. pp 163–195JELENA MARKOVIĆ | THE SILENCE OF FEAR…
us the day before, so we did not require context for what we saw. I found the tour of the 
village and the cemetery very emotional. None of those present wanted to abruptly break 
the silence. For the most part, these were so-called “eloquent silences”7 (also known as 
“pregnant silences”), i.e. silences filled with the presence of unverbalized thoughts and 
feelings. We found ourselves connected by this silence. Our shared anxiety was, in a way, 
comforting. It functioned as a means for creating interpersonal connections.
BIRDS
Miro8 and Marta, a married couple, visited some of the devastated villages after the war. 
At one point, they said the following:
Miro: I have the silence in […]9 on camera. Listen, that is one of the scariest things 
imaginable. 
Marta: No birds, nothing. Nothing. 
Miro: Nothing, no life. 
Marta: Everybody has left, even the birds. Not a single bird there. 
Miro: No chirping, no sounds, nothing. Completely dead. That’s probably what kills you 
the most. Hey, the birds have left. 
Marta: Yeah, there was nothing there. 
Miro: Birds. 
Marta: Not a single one. A single one.
Miro: Horrible.
GUILT
Tamara “suffocated” her story of emotionally intense and traumatic experiences with 
repeated (unexpectedly excessive) claims that neither she nor any member of her family 
had ever caused harm to anyone else, that her suffering and fear were undeserved, and 
that it was not the result of her actions towards the object of fear, as the generally accepted 
and officially endorsed narrative of the war implied. For example:
Tamara: My husband never did anything wrong, my father never did anything wrong, 
my father-in-law never did anything wrong. […] What am I to do? We never occupied 
anyone. We’re in our own house. My family never did anything wrong to anyone. Why 
run? But you get swept away by this mass fear. Mass fear takes over you and, well, 
you’re not crazy. They will come and kill your children, who knows what they’ll do to you, 
7 For more on eloquent silences, see Ephratt 2008; also see e.g. Tannen 1985; Saville-Troike 1985; 
Jaworski 1997; Kenny 2011.
8 Miro is the only interlocutor who identifies as a member of the majority ethnic group.
9 The name of the locality was left out to protect the identity of the interlocutor.
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and then you say: Don’t be foolish! How? Who would that? What? Who? […] But you get 
carried away by mass hysteria. Fear.
During our interaction, I interpreted the suffocating overuse of such formulations as a 
manifestation of the need to relieve her story of collective guilt, and to present it as her own. 
THE SON
Tamara is a mother of two. She described her impressions of her son’s experience, which 
he prefers not to talk about, as follows: 
Tamara: The girl was four and my son was ten years old. He hadn’t even turned ten yet. 
When you have to carry your ten-year-old son in your arms because he’s paralysed with 
fear… Yes. It stays with you. It stays with you in a scary way.
Jelena: Does he remember this? Does he ever talk about it? 
Tamara: He doesn’t like to talk about it because… Again, it’s the way he was raised, you 
see. They are six years apart, I thought he was already a mature child and all that. He was 
very happy to hear that he was going to get a baby sister, and I’ve raised him since the 
day she was born that she should mean everything to him and that he should take care 
of her. In those moments, he was very worried about keeping his sister safe and he would 
always hold her close. He always held her close. Hugging her. For example, he spent the 
entire journey with his knees pressed against his chest. He would hold his legs close to 
make room in the trailer so that his sister could lie down. And he doesn’t like to talk about 
it. He doesn’t. Well, he’s a man. He probably sees this differently than I do as his mother.
HISTORY
Lidija suggested that we talk to Goran. We explained to him that we were interested in 
hearing about his wartime experiences. This is how he started the conversation:
Goran: I got the impression from Lidija and over the phone that you were serious people. 
[…]
Goran (ironizing): You are going to misuse this and take advantage of me anyway.
After several exchanges, he continues:
Goran: I speak freely. It’s all the same to me. Even if you were… I respect people, and 
I divide them into good and bad people. Everything else, political beliefs, I’m not inter-
ested in that, especially not in genocide and killing. Whatever. In order to tell the story I 
promised to tell, I need to say that.
His story of the war begins with historical events in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the 
interests of great powers in the geopolitical area he lives in. Despite our attempts to steer 
the conversation, Goran avoided speaking from a personal perspective during the entire 
interview. In his case, silence refers to the omission of a personal perspective and personal 
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experience. He mostly related his vision of “grand history”. The way he shaped it into a 
story was a clear reflection of his political positions.
PITS10
Lidija: See, that’s exactly why it started. They say there were pits before so there will be 
pits again […]. That, that is the thing nobody wants to say out loud, but I’m openly saying 
it to you now.
THE CHANDELIER
Lidija has no chandeliers in her apartment. Bare light bulbs hang from her ceiling. When 
my colleague and I entered her house, she told us that she would not buy a chandelier 
again. She used to have a chandelier before the war, “a beautiful one” which she paid “over 
1000 German marks” for. This chandelier was destroyed together with her house. She 
told us about the pointlessness of buying expensive things when you can lose them in a 
second. On the one hand, the light bulbs hanging from the ceiling are a quiet reminder 
of the past in the everyday life of the family, a memento, vestige and metaphor for the 
“difficult past” marking the presence of that which is long gone (Kidron 2009: 6); on the 
other hand, they are also an anticipation of future evil.
THE CUP
Davor: The only trace of my pre-war life is this cup which I found among the burned 
remains of the house [he points to a charred cup positioned at the very centre of the 
glassware cabinet in the living room; after this, a long silence ensued].
WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE
Zdravka: It’s water under the bridge. May it never happen again. We need to move on. 
We need to accept it. When I think… I can’t even think about it. It’s not my… Or maybe 
it is. It’s hard to do it again… We’re in this situation. There’s no person smart enough 
to… It would be better… No point. Water under the bridge, may it never happen again 
to anyone. It’s not worth talking about. It’s not. How could I talk about it? There are no 
words. May it never happen again.
The transcribed account lasted for nearly two minutes.
10 The pits in question are mass graves for victims of war crimes.
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ABSOLUTE SILENCE 
My colleague and I visited Sanja and Branko, a married couple, on two occasions. During 
all our meetings, Sanja would talk about her experience without inhibition; Branko, on the 
other hand, would not, but would regularly join in if we engaged in small talk. A number 
of times, he would leave the house and then come back after a while. At one point, he 
unexpectedly joined the conversation and said: 
Branko: My approach is absolute silence. Because if I had thought that I should give my 
account… OK. The worst thing of all is that I made it a rule for myself to say that I’m not 
responsible for anything. It’s all falling apart and I’m just sitting there smiling. Like the 
village idiot. 
These examples show some of the forms of silence which I noticed, and which will be 
discussed in the text. I am aware that not all readers will see silence in all these cases. 
Silence is an important aspect of communication, one of its indispensable parts, but it 
can also be easily overlooked or incorrectly (re)constructed. Silence can go unnoticed, but 
this does not mean that it will go away (cf. Kenny 2011: 49). Silence is effective precisely 
because it allows us to believe “that the unspoken is nonexistent” (Achino-Loeb 2006a: 
11); at the same time, that which is left unsaid does not disappear – it is only reflected in 
a different way (ibid.). “Silence never ceases to imply its opposite and to depend on its 
presence” (Sontag 1969: 10). In the examples given above, silence is seen as a productive 
and effective cultural and affective practice which produces the margins of language and/
or society. 
3. WHAT IS SILENCE: PART TWO
In this section, as in the examples presented before, I will try to provide a partial answer 
to the question: what is silence? It seems that this could be a “deceptively simple question 
that does not yield simple answers” (van Elferen and Raeymaekers 2015: 262–263). Is 
silence only the absence of verbal communication or could it also be a means of com-
munication? If we consider silence to be one of the active aspects of communication, 
how can we know that something has been left unsaid? How do we know what was left 
unsaid? “How does voice inform silence and, […] how does silence inform voice” (Fivush 
2010: 88)? When communicating, how can we know whether a specific silence is com-
municable or incommunicable? How do we know whether it is intentional or unintentional? 
Who is allowed to be the arbiter, and based on what criteria? If silence is always connected 
to a certain discourse, is the following question relevant: does silence make sense? Or, 
what sense does silence make (cf. Dauenhauer 1980)? Is it more important to know what 
silence means or what it does (cf. Guillaume 2018: 482)? How can we create a typol-
ogy of silence and which criteria should we use? Can the duration of silence always be 
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measured? Is silence limited to a conversational encounter or do long-lasting silences 
spill over into conversations? Is silence a negatively marked absence which weighs as a 
burden over individuals and communities or can it also act as a constitutive environment, 
as the imagination of freedom? Is it just the individual who is silent or is he a member of a 
community? What is contained within the “emptiness” of silence?
Over the last seventy years, these and other complex questions were discussed in nu-
merous academic texts belonging to different scholarly traditions from all over the world. 
An overview of studies about silence definitely cannot be introduced with the familiar 
academic formula that something (in this case silence) has not been sufficiently discussed 
or has not been adequately examined, or that different aspects and perspectives had not 
previously been taken into account. Therefore, if one considers the amount and scope of 
existing research on the topic of silence, we could say that this overview will be dispropor-
tionately brief and incomplete.11 
The emergence of scholarly interest in silence can be traced to musicology and essays 
written during the 1950s and 1960s (see American composer John Cage (1961)12 and 
Swiss writer Max Picard (1964)); however, linguists were the first ones to introduce the 
topic into academia, with two distinct approaches emerging (see Ephratt 2008: 1910). The 
first approach was influenced by philosophy and literature, with its view of the topic limited 
to a pragmatic interpretation of eloquent silence from the perspective of its function (e.g. 
Jensen 1973; Bruneau 1973). The second approach focused on acoustics, more specifi-
cally, chronometric analysis of speech (for an overview, see Ephratt 2008: 1910). However, 
11 Silence has been discussed from the perspective of linguistics (sociolinguistics, pragmatics, discourse 
analysis, etc.) (e.g. Bruneau 1973; Jensen 1973; Saville-Troike 1985; Tannen and Saville-Troike 1985; DeVito 
1989; Jaworski 1988/1989, 1993, 1997, 1997a, 2005; Kurzon, 1998; Jaworski and Galasiński 2000; Wajnryb 
2002; Nakane 2007; Ephratt 2008; Schröter 2013), musicology (e.g. Cage 1961; Nyman 1974; Beeman 
2006), cultural anthropology (e.g. Trouillot 2005/1995; Achino-Loeb 2006, 2006a, 2006b; Fernandez 
2006; Kidron 2009; Pagis 2010; Sue 2015; Seljamaa and Siim 2016; Seljamaa 2016), folklore studies 
(e.g. Goldstein 2009), historiography (e.g. Winter 2010; Freund 2013; Sheftel and Zembrzycki 2013; Corbin 
2018), communicology (e.g. Kenny 2011; Berger 2004), rhetoric (e.g. Scott 1993; Farmer 2001; Glenn 2004; 
Grant-Davie 2013), international relations (e.g. Guillaume 2018), psychology and psychotherapy (e.g. Wil-
liams 2001; McKinney 2007; Fivush 2010; Sorsoli 2010; Pasupathi and McLean 2010; Valle 2019), sociology 
(e.g. Luhmann 1994/1989; Zerubavel 2006, 2010; Vinitzky-Seroussi and Teeger 2010), legal science (e.g. 
Godwin Phelps 2004), philosophy (e.g. Dauenhauer 1980; Nudds 2001; Maitra 2004; Gilkey 2007; Nudds 
and O’Callaghan 2009; Sorensen 2009), art studies (e.g. van Elferen and Raeymaekers 2015) and other 
disciplines, as well as within the broader interdisciplinary domain of the humanities and social sciences 
(Jaworski 1997a; Clair 1998; Mazzei 2007; Sim 2007; Glenn and Ratcliffe 2011; Kenny 2011; Boldt, Federici 
and Virgulti 2013; Muñoz 2014).
12 Composer John Cage created the composition 4’33” in 1952. The entire piece consists of environ-
mental sounds from the space in which it is performed. During the performance, the musician sits at a closed 
piano. The title refers to the duration of the composition. Cage proved that the discomfort experienced by 
the audience while “listening” to the composition is actually the key to defining and understanding silence. 
Rather then standing for a complete absence of sound, the silence in Cage’s composition consists of ambient 
and unintended noise. He demonstrated to the audience “that distinguishing music from silence is a problem 
of cognitive framing” (Beeman 2006: 24). For more on Cage’s composition, see Dodd 2018. A video of the 
performance: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTEFKFiXSx4.
173
NU 57/1, 2020. pp 163–195 JELENA MARKOVIĆ | THE SILENCE OF FEAR…
more recent studies insist that silence is not just an acoustic phenomenon but also a 
cultural construct. Silence is also considered to be a kind of sound (Beeman 2006: 24). 
Initially, researchers approached silence as a bound phenomenon which could be 
easily identified (Tannen and Saville-Troike 1985; Jaworski 1993), only to later switch to 
the idea of “silence as metaphor for communication” (Jaworski 1997: 3); this was done 
to make possible the formulation of the concept of silence which would go beyond the 
idea that it is just the absence of sound or communication. Sociolinguist Adam Jaworski 
emphasises the symbolic link between speech and silence, where silence is always a part 
of the linguistic context: “silence and speech do not stand in total opposition to each other, 
but form a continuum of forms ranging from the most prototypical instances of silence 
to the most prototypical instances of speech” (1993: 25). Therefore, he insists on a view 
which sees silence and speech not as binary opposites but as complementary concepts 
(1993: 44, 46). Another designation given to silence is that it is also a metaphor for power, 
perceived either as absence or repressed, unobtrusive presence (Achino-Loeb 2006a: 
1–2). Metaphorical silence forces us to consider the gaps in our knowledge of the world 
and represents a kind of “epistemological haunting: it represents the fear of the unknown 
by acting as an un-sonic announcer of uncanny returns” (van Elferen and Raeymaekers 
2015: 264).
In the 1970s, linguistic studies also focused on bringing silence into relation with the 
negatively marked absence which is indicative of passivity, negative emotions, avoidance, 
silencing, inability, powerlessness and so on, i.e. with the absence of speech, meaning or 
intention. This approach was later also taken up by researchers in other disciplines (e.g. 
Bruneau 1973: 18; Dauenhauer 1980: 5; Zerubavel 2006: 13; Achino-Loeb 2006a, 2006b; 
Thiesmeyer 2003, 2003a; Schröter 2013 and others). 
Trends in linguistics in the 1980s show the introduction of different aspects of eloquent, 
communicable silence, i.e. silence which can be “heard”, silence which “speaks” (Tannen 
1985; Saville-Troike 1985; Jaworski 1997; Kurzon 1998 and many others). This laid the 
foundations for the later increase in interest for the concept of eloquent silence in other 
disciplines, e.g. anthropology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, law (for an overview, see Ephratt 
2008: 1933), historiography (especially in studies relying on oral history, cf. Farmer and 
Strain 2011; Sheftel and Zembrzycki 2013; Freund 2013).
3.1. TYPOLOGIES OF SILENCE
Beginning with linguistics and communicology, a number of typologies of silence were 
created across various disciplines using different criteria depending on the specific 
research tradition or research focus (for example, see Jensen 1973; Bruneau 1973; Saville-
Troike 1985; Jaworski 1993; Langton 1993; Kenny 2011; Kurzon 2007; Ephratt 2008; 
Winter 2010; Schröter 2013; van Elferen and Raeymaekers 2015; Valle 2019). From the 
earliest to the most recent examples, typologies of silence tried to systematise its ubiquity, 
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dependence on context, elusiveness, its multiple meanings for different actors and its 
varying duration (which is often not measurable in chronometric terms), etc. Typologi-
sation was used in an attempt to understand the aporia of its (in)comprehensibility, the 
relation between its duration and its prohibitiveness, its “emptiness”, the relation between 
the unspoken text and the type of silence, the intentions of the silent individual, and the 
power relations emerging in silence and influenced by it. I will attempt to consider these 
different typologies from the perspective of the contextually dependent and ambivalent 
effects of silence, its “emptiness”, its duration and the actors involved (individuals and 
collectives); additionally, I will try to further elaborate on these features of silence by using 
examples from the described fieldwork, with my goal being the comprehension of the 
different forms of silence I witnessed in specific circumstances. 
3.1.1. The functions and (ambivalent) effects of silence and silencing 
One of the first typologies was created by Vernon Jensen in 1973. He identified five basic 
communicational functions of silence: linkage function, affecting function, revelational 
function, judgemental function and activating function (Jensen 1973). According to Jen-
sen, each of these five functions can be realised in two ways depending on the context. 
Silence with the linkage function can bring people closer together, but also isolate some 
of the participants of the conversation. The affecting function may be wounding, but it 
might also have a healing effect. Silence can also reveal or conceal states of psychological 
distress. The revelational function means that silence can reveal or withhold information. 
The judgemental function can point to agreement or disagreement over an issue. As for 
the activating function, it refers to the notion that silence can be indicative of activity but 
also of the absence of activity. This typology is important because it shows that silence 
can have different functions, as well as varied effects on individuals and communities. 
Psychologist Robyn Fivush (2010) insists on the useful, albeit simplified distinction 
between the concepts of being silenced and being silence. Being silenced implies a kind 
of contrast with voice and can be understood as imposition; furthermore, it stands for the 
loss of power and the loss of the storytelling right (see the examples “Guilt”, “Water Under 
the Bridge”, “Absolute Silence”). Silence can also be conceptualised as being silence, which 
implies sharing, understanding, a different mode of communication, knowledge and emo-
tion transfer. This mode does not require a voice and does not have to be supplemented (or 
at least not to the same extent) with the verbal component of language (see the examples 
“The Walk”, “The Chandelier”, “The Cup”). To sum up, Fivush believes that silence can be 
imposed on someone (being silenced) or shared as the background for shared knowledge 
and the comprehension of that which does not need to be verbalised (being silence) (cf. 
Fivush 2010). However, both types of silence can manifest themselves as their opposite 
and have contradictory effects.
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Silence can be conceptualised in numerous – sometimes even opposing – ways: it 
can ruin potential opportunities for communication, but also encourage them and help 
create more meaningful and substantial relationships. Being silenced is often seen as a 
negative absence, with the implicit or explicit (internal or external) stipulation that some 
experiences and/or themes should not be talked about. It is a form of tacitly established 
social contract. A violent past is in itself a powerful factor of silencing. The suppression 
of language can also be understood as an attempt to deal with affects in order to prevent 
future conflict; however, resistance towards language should also be interpreted as the 
creation of an alternative system of communication which is not linguistic. 
Experiences of war which cannot be absorbed into the dominant narrative are marked 
by silence, especially due to fear of transmission of the narrative within a broader social 
context (see “The Pub”) or if it is believed that the recipient at the conversational level 
would not be able to hear, accept or understand the experience being narrated, as well as 
if it is not desirable or possible to believe that the experience is true (see “Guilt”). Lidija, 
for example, is aware of the contextual dependence of her story and its possible effects, 
along with being aware of the context and effects of the silence marking the affective 
atmosphere of the society in which her story is received.
Lidija: If you hadn’t heard this side [referring to her experience, her “side” of the story], 
sitting on the other side, you would say: “Impossible, it did not happen like that.” Only 
when you hear it, you can understand.
Miro offered a possible vision of what could happen if his “terrifying” stories broke out 
from the zone of silence. However, from his statement, it is clear that he does not see this 
as a possibility.
Miro: If it were possible to hear these stories, it would bring a huge amount of pain. It 
would destroy some of those preconditions. Because it destroys life itself. When you 
have been raised for thirty years to believe that they [the ethnic Other] are like that, then 
it is extremely painful when somebody says that isn’t so. What then, should I erase those 
thirty years? These stories can’t go out because the majority would have to deal with a 
lot of pain. It would be a huge break. It would be unbearable.
Shared silences can also be the cause and consequence of meaningful, functional and 
affectively aligned relationships as in the examples “Tears”, “The Walk”, “The Pub” and 
“The Chandelier”. Along with being an indication of communicational breakdown, shared 
silence can also be “a silent attunement, a sense of simply being together in the moment, 
that may actually promote healing” (Fivush 2010: 92). Shared fear and anxiety, much like 
shared silence, can also connect people and act as a kind of social magnet. Silence is, 
therefore, also a sign of an individual’s affective and/or emotional alignment.13 Moments 
of silence can bring people together and create common histories and emotional connec-
13 “The Walk” contains elements of what Kurzon refers to as situational silence (Kurzon 2007: 1681–1684), 
characteristic, among other things, of commemorative practices. The tour of the ruined village and cemetery 
was, in many ways, commemorative.
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tions. Silence can create a shared space in which all those participating in communication 
are emotionally harmonised; conversely, it can also encourage emotional alienation, 
distancing and intolerance (cf. Fivush 2010: 92). 
The ambivalent effects of silence, put simply, also resulted in the formation of two 
dominant approaches to silence (see Pagis 2010: 312) connected to fear, trauma, violence 
and anxiety. The first approach sees silence as the consequence of a heavy psychological 
burden, as an indication of the “unspeakability” of a traumatic or terrifying experience – but 
also as a sign of political repression. The second approach goes beyond the logocentric 
interpretations of silence and tries to see it as the constitutive environment of (the terrify-
ing and traumatic) experience, and sometimes even a sign of resistance (cf. Fivush 2010: 
93 and later) and the imagination of freedom (cf. Brown 2005/1998: 96).
According to the first approach, silence is an intense psychological burden which 
does not allow the victim (the one suffering in silence) to create an intersubjective space 
around their own experience (Butler 1982). From this perspective, silence connected to 
trauma is discursively shaped as the stifling of speech, which does not stem from one’s 
own personal will, but from the unspeakable nature of the experience which is beyond 
narration. The traumatic event creates a rupture in the linear flow of experience, so any 
attempt at verbal representation has to inherently resist narration (Caruth 1995; cf. Kidron 
2009: 7), as can be seen in the example titled “Water Under the Bridge”. In this case, 
speech is given the property of being able to relieve one of fear and anxiety, which is not 
what happens in the example. The western idea of mental health also incorporates this 
notion. The goal of many psychotherapeutic procedures and processes of reconciliation 
among mutually hostile communities is to bring to light that which was silenced despite 
the complex circumstances and mechanisms which originally created and continue to 
uphold the state of silence, where such a state is usually seen as having a negative effect 
on the individual’s mental health and the sustainable coexistence of different groups (cf. 
Valle 2019). In psychology, silence connected to trauma is framed as a failure of speech, 
i.e. as dysfunctional absence of voice which requires a therapeutic procedure to restore 
voice and create a meaningful narrative about the traumatic experience (Kidron 2009: 7). 
Michal Pagis believes that this approach “is part of modern Western culture’s emphasis 
on speech – both as a democratic right and as an important part of sociality” (2010: 312). 
Some interlocutors pointed out that talking about their difficult past, fear and trauma 
retraumatises them. Silence is a kind of (temporary) protection from retraumatisation. In 
other words, silence is a declaration of trauma and prevents it from entering language.
Miro: No, when we start talking about these things then… We get completely screwed 
up. But that’s why we don’t go back to them that often, you know. 
Sanja: People find it difficult to open up. We have forgotten. Why would you bring it up 
again? It’s not fear. After conversations like that, you need some time to collect yourself. 
Now you’ve set it aside and you live with it in the back of your mind, but let me be, I’ve 
had enough of it.
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The first approach also sees silence as the result of oppression and a conspiracy of 
silence, where silence is understood as the denial of voice and where to be silent means to 
be silenced (Zerubavel 2006; Thiesmeyer 2003, 2003a). From this perspective, silence 
can also be considered the result of power relations in society. Self-expression is thus 
limited by silence, resulting in a feeling of isolation among individuals and groups who can 
no longer know whether others also share their experiences, which then only reinforces 
silence. 
Maria-Luisa Achino-Loeb sees silence as the “vehicle for the exercise of power in all its 
modalities” (2006a: 3). Silence is implied in power at the level of everyday interactions, 
as well as in the processes of silencing the Other in order to gain power or keep it. In that 
sense, the practices of silence are part of every identity experience, where they constitute 
a discrete entity; they are the substrate of identity, but also practices which serve either 
domination or resistance (ibid.). On the other hand, silencing is a part of the process 
which creates social hierarchy and contributes to it (Thiesmeyer 2003a). Silencing is an 
act which can either be a one-time or repeated occurrence, and it is based on unequal 
negotiation; in other words, it is an act which tries to shape or uphold the relationship in 
which there is an obvious or symbolic disproportion in the social value of the exchange (cf. 
Thiesmeyer 2003a: 3–4). It is a long-lasting process, but should not be considered linear 
or circular. This process is susceptible to various oscillations and changes in direction, 
and is also continuously involved in the creation of new relationships in which the position 
of the speakers is not always equally (dis)advantageous. Silencing is an active socially 
constructed practice (cf. Thiesmeyer 2003a: 4). 
The second approach see silence as a meaningful, constitutive (constructive) environ-
ment (cf. Pagis 2010; Kidron 2009). In Perspectives on Silence (1985), Muriel Saville-
Troike already established a broader ethnographic framework that could be used to study 
silence. She claims that silence can have propositional content which can be determined 
from the context. Silence, she argues, “is more context-embedded than speech” (1985: 
11). Silence possesses an illocutionary force and, therefore, “may be used to question, 
promise, deny, warn, threaten, insult, request or command” (1985: 11). Silence does not 
have to designate a negatively marked absence even when the unspoken is something 
uncomfortable, dangerous or burdensome. It does not necessarily signal, as implied by 
the first approach (strongly influenced by “western” psychosocial norms), the processes 
of avoidance and repression or the collective processes of political subjugation or socially 
suspect processes of personal secrecy (cf. Kidron 2009: 6). Logocentric interpretations 
of silence have neglected the role of silence as a medium of expression, communication 
and knowledge transfer which is not dependent on speech. The extreme espoused by 
the second approach emphasises that forms of knowledge which resist articulation and 
collective enlistment, and which exist as non-verbal, intersubjective, embodied and mate-
rial traces of the past in everyday life, can be transmitted to others in silence or through 
the use of it (Kidron 2009: 7). In actuality, it is communication which takes place below 
the surface of socially noticeable forms. These are silences which bring together families 
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and small groups in which they are communicated. The examples “The Cup” and “The 
Chandelier” point precisely to such non-narrative practices which keep the difficult past 
present through the silence of inanimate “witnesses”, designating “the presence of the 
past [in the] daily fabric of domestic life” (Kidron 2009: 13). Practices like these can be 
seen as a powerful factor in the transgenerational transfer of knowledge of the past. As 
illustrated in “The Chandelier”, the return of evil is still expected in Lidija’s house, two and 
a half decades after the war. Even though the experience of fear is most often perceived 
as a discomfort in the present (and this discomfort also extends to the future), this type of 
fear dwells in the background of “normal” life, family affection, love towards one’s home, 
and the struggle to make a living. The light bulb hanging from the ceiling instead of a 
“beautiful” chandelier is a “domesticated” reminder of the painful past, but it is also a 
token of hope for a better future, or at least one in which there will not be as much to lose. 
It expresses the same idea as the one found in verbalised minimalist forms such as “it’s 
water under the bridge, may it never happen again”. Such exchanges of knowledge occur 
outside of specific locations or recordable moments of interaction. A non-verbal intergen-
erational exchange of knowledge is thus realised, empathic relationships are established 
and understanding fostered – despite the fact that this process was neither “linear” nor 
verbal (cf. Kidron 2009: 16).
3.1.2. “Emptiness” of silence and/or “fulness” of sound
[T]he silence we think we perceive in the world is not real silence: 
in fact, we hear many things but negate or virtualize them into an 
Imaginary silence. (van Elferen and Raeymaekers 2015: 268)
Melani Schröter refers to one of the most important and most studied aspects of silence 
as the “emptiness” of silence (2013: 16). The “emptiness” of silence refers to the presence 
of other potentially communicable content, e.g. gestures, visual stimuli (as in the example 
“A Walk”, where there is a kind of synaesthesia – looking at the ruined houses, we see 
“silence”), sounds or their unexpected absence (see “Birds”), the affective and emotional 
charges which constitute the so-called pregnant or eloquent silence (one which is filled 
with the presence of non-verbalised thoughts and feelings, e.g. sadness – see “Tears”; 
trauma – see “Water Under the Bridge” and “No Words”; guilt – see “Guilt”), and so on. 
This “emptiness” can also be filled with verbal expressions used to avoid the topic of 
the conversation, which can be either agreed upon or imposed; thus, it can also be seen 
as “garrulous silence” in which speaking serves as the “carapace of speech” (Kenny 2011: 
x), as in “The Pub” or partly in “History”, in which a more personal perspective is being 
avoided rather than the topic itself. 
Silence, therefore, cannot be defined based on the absence of speech, as there are 
many forms of silence which do not rule out the presence of speech. Melani Schröter 
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(2013) has identified three types of silence which cannot be defined based on the absence 
of speech. The first type is characterised by structural empty slots such as pauses, zero 
morphemes, ellipsis, aposiopesis (see Schröter 2013: 17). The second type is character-
ised by semantic and/or logical empty slots such as presuppositions (cf. Huckin 2002; 
Jalbert 1994), connotations, allusions and implicatures14 (cf. Schröter 2013: 17). In specific 
situations, such as the one in the example titled “The Pub”, logorrhoea can also be a form 
of silence. The third type of silence which does not rule out speech according to Schröter 
(2013: 17) is concealment, which is often more eloquent. Verbal communication can have 
the function of concealment. Silence, therefore, does not necessarily mean concealment; 
similarly, verbal communication does not necessarily mean that there is no concealment 
taking place. The amount of speech is just one of the aspects around which we construct 
our impressions of our own or somebody else’s silence (cf. Jaworski 1993). 
In their interdisciplinary analysis of silences as cultural practices and artistic interpreta-
tions of silence, Isabella van Elferen and Sven Raeymaekers (2015) devised a typology 
consisting of five different forms of silence, bringing together the phenomenological, 
ontological, metaphysical, psychoanalytical and metaphorical approaches to silence. This 
typology clearly shows that absolute silence is not possible within our perception of reality, 
but is vital for understanding the “emptiness” of silence. 
Their typology consists of the following: a metaphorical form of silence, two different 
phenomenological forms of silence (silence by negation and virtual silence), an ontological 
form of silence, and a metaphysical form of silence. Their typology is important because 
the “emptiness” of silence is taken to its logical extreme in the concept of the so-called 
metaphysical, or absolute, silence. All the forms of silence identified in this analysis are 
defined based on their relation to the “ultimate form of silence: an absolute silence, silence 
in and of itself that is not limited to being the horizon of sound” (2015: 270). For example, 
in the case of metaphysical silence, the authors believe that silence “represents the ab-
sence: the absence of emotion, of sound, of speech and of language” (2015: 264). Even 
though it denotes absence, silence also denotes presence because it is always “filled” with 
something. For example, a temporary or permanent absence of language and/or speech, 
as in the examples “Tears”, “The Walk”, “Birds”, “No Words” and “Water Under the Bridge”, 
does not mean that there was also a lack of shared emotional charge in the conversation. 
Silence can, therefore, function as a metaphor for the unknown, but can also denote stasis, 
which can be interpreted as tension, stillness, and contrast to the flux of life – but also as 
balance, repression or oppression, etc. (2015: 264).15 One of the two phenomenological 
forms of silence defined by the authors based on its relation to absolute silence is silence 
14 For more on conversational implicatures, see Kordić 1991.
15 Similarly, Adam Jaworski distinguishes between two distinct features of silence, which he describes 
using the following metaphorical conceptualisations: “silence is a substance/object” and “silence is a con-
tainer” (1993: 82). The first one pertains to “heavy, tomblike silence” or “a wall of silence”, whereas the second 
one is related to silence as an environment in which activity can go on without words (to eat in silence, to 
make love in silence, to exercise in silence, to walk in silence).
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through negation: “a relative form of silence that is positioned between sound and com-
plete soundlessness, a form of silence that consists of and exists amid ignored sound” 
(2015: 265).16 This was the silence so intensely experienced by the protagonists of the 
example “Birds”. In this example, the silence “heard” by the protagonists is not absolute 
– instead, it refers to the absence of the usual and expected ambient sounds at the site. 
They ignored the remaining environmental noise in favour of the “silence” they “heard”.
The last form of silence, which van Elferen and Raeymaekers refer to as “actual” or 
“ontological silence”, can be understood by acknowledging that the ontology of silence is 
“inextricably linked with that of sound” (2015: 267). “Sound is thus defined and limited by 
silence. Silence, in turn, is defined by the absence of sound and limited by the occurrence 
of sound” (2015: 267). They also consider silence to be sound’s photo negative (2015: 
267). By analogy, the ontological view of silence, or the “emptiness” of silence, is defined 
based on the “fullness” of sound. Accordingly, when a verbal exchange fails our expecta-
tions, we register silence.
A more detailed inquiry into the “emptiness” of silence raises another interesting ques-
tion. Silence can be misinterpreted and can be noticed even where there is none, but are 
there silences which cannot be linked to communication in any way?
German sociologist and political philosopher Niklas Luhmann believes that within 
communication, the world is given to communication only as a paradox (1994/1989: 26). 
The world is not something which has to be understood (or not understood) for com-
munication to proceed. The enactment of communication severs the unity of the world, 
i.e. it affirms this unity implicitly by severing it, while also negating this unity by implicitly 
reconstructing it (ibid.: 26). The world cannot be communicated, but when it is included 
in communication, it appears as the paradox of the unity of difference, “a paradox that 
requires a solution if things are to continue at all” (ibid.: 26). In that case, the world remains 
incommunicable. Only that which has been noticed and described is communicable. In 
that sense, “[t]he thematization of incommunicability in communication can then also be 
viewed as an indicator of the fact that the world is carried along” (ibid.: 26). Interpreta-
tion of silence can be understood as the autopoiesis of communication (ibid.: 35),17 i.e. 
as a self-sustaining and self-producing system with its own distinct features and limits. If 
silence is not communicable, then it is a silence which no longer desires to be understood 
or communicated, which does not require the distinction between speech and silence. 
For something to be characterised as “silence”, it has to be recognised as communication 
or something pertaining to communication. In reality, silence is not an activity which oc-
curs outside of society; instead, it is “only a counter-image which society projects into its 
16 The second phenomenological form of silence only appears as such, but includes the anticipation 
of sound “created by the combination of technological means and listener perception” (van Elferen and 
Raeymaekers 2015: 269). This is the silence which occurs before an acoustic event. 
17 As an example of the autopoiesis of communication, Luhmann mentions professions dealing with 
communication with elderly and sick people, to whom people working in such professions offer entertain-
ment, education, comfort and so on (Luhmann 1994/1989: 35).
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environment, or it is the mirror in which society comes to see that what is not said is not 
said” (ibid.: 33). Every system, Luhmann claims, co-produces that which does not enter 
the system and which we could call [!] “silence”, but it also produces silence “without the 
ability to connect” (ibid.: 34). 
In different typologies of silence, no matter the sample used (silence caused by anxiety 
and fear, strained relationships or avoiding the topic of the conversation), it is evident 
that many of the included silences do not manifest themselves through the absence of 
speech or sound. Many silences are directed and purposeful, i.e. marked by the absence 
of conventional verbal exchanges, and not necessarily by the absence of sound. Silences 
are either that which goes beyond words and verbal expression or that which has been 
left out or replaced with something else, and which has not met the expectations set 
forth by the context of what is being discussed. Silences are never absolute. As snippets, 
allusions, signs, atmospheres, shared or conflicting emotions, they penetrate through the 
verbal structure of language and our perception of communication. However, could it be 
concluded that it is highly likely that many silences still go unnoticed? Does this mean that 
they do not exist or that they do not have meaning?
There are silences which can be noticed and those which do not want to be noticed 
or which lack meaning (cf. Kurzon 1998). We can discuss silence within the framework 
of the complex network of intentions of the different participants of the conversation, 
the assumed (non-)communicative silences and the many different expectations of the 
participants. Scholarly literature dealing with silence often distinguishes between commu-
nicative and non-communicative silence, as well as intentional and unintentional silence. 
The first distinction largely refers to the recipient’s, whereas the second one refers to the 
speaker’s domain (i.e. that of the “owner” of silence). 
Adam Jaworski believes that “[j]ust as there are different types and forms of speech, 
silence will also be perceived as taking different forms, depending on one’s expectations 
toward a given communicative event” (1993: 73). In regular circumstances, even if com-
munication is not expected, we will take notice of the realisation of speech and try to 
assign meaning to it. However, if we are not expecting communication, we will not register 
silence nor will we try to interpret it and give it meaning (ibid.: 77). Only after a detailed 
analysis of the context could we determine “what could have been said yet wasn’t” (Huckin 
2002: 353; original emphasis). 
Dennis Kurzon makes a clear distinction between intentional and unintentional silence. 
This dichotomy forms the backbone of his typology (1995; 2007). He believes that the 
main requirement for a silence to have meaning is the speaker’s intention to be silent. 
If there is no intention on behalf of the speaker to leave something unsaid, then it is a 
silence which is linguistically meaningless (1998). The act of intentional silence or omis-
sion requires some kind of implicit reference to speech. 
The process of searching for implicit references to speech and/or the “emptiness” of 
silence is actually a projection (not necessarily erroneous) made onto the communicational 
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field. Silence is a social construct, a projection of the recipient’s/researcher’s habitus onto 
the microtext of the interaction in accordance with the broader social context. The assess-
ment of what constitutes the remains of communication in what was left unsaid, or of its 
“emptiness”, is not something which can be validated, confirmed or proven. The status and 
meaning assigned to a particular silence by the recipient can, but does not have to be the 
same at the moment of occurrence and at the moment of recollection. Therefore, silence 
can only be studied in the form of a trace or residue of meaning, or as the non-verbal 
framework for meanings which cannot be interpreted (cf. Watts 1997; Javorski 1997). With-
out interpretation “experience cannot be parsed into selective absence, rather it collapses 
into absolute simultaneity; presence and absence become one” (Achino-Loeb 2006a: 1). 
3.1.3. The duration of silence 
Some typologies show the link between the duration of silence, the number of participants 
in the interaction and its prohibitiveness more clearly.
Communicologist Thomas Bruneau believes that silence is shaped by language (1973: 
20). He devised one of the first typologies which focused on the relationship between 
silence and the perception of time. Applying this perspective, he identified the following 
types of silence: psycholinguistic, interactive and socio-cultural silence (ibid.: 23–42). 
Psycholinguistic silence, Bruneau believes, is very short in duration. It manifests itself in 
the form of hesitation or intentionally slowing down the tempo so that the recipient could 
follow what is being recounted. Additional manifestations include self-corrections, stutter-
ing and so on. On average, interactive silence lasts longer than psycholinguistic silence 
and is connected to interpersonal relations. It manifests itself in the form of intentional 
pauses in the conversation. Finally, socio-cultural silence can be interpreted on the basis 
of cultural codes and norms; according to Bruneau, it also includes the other two types of 
silence – psycholinguistic and interactive silence – in the sense that they can be manipu-
lated by social and cultural norms (ibid.: 36). Bruneau’s typology implies that even though 
some silences can appear short in the given situation, they can also be reflections of other, 
long-lasting silences.
The duration of silence can have a significant influence on its interpretation. Some 
silences require the shortest possible duration (hesitation pauses), whereas others are 
generally not as short and have a tendency towards prolongation (cold silence, silence 
as punishment, isolating silence) (Schröter 2013: 16). Eviatar Zerubavel also warned of 
the “cumulative nature of silence” (Zerubavel 2006: 58). He believes that the intensity of 
silence is not only affected by the number of participants in the conspiracy of silence – it 
is also affected by its duration. The longer a silence lasts, the more prohibitive it becomes, 
with consequences for society as a whole also increasing in severity (Zerubavel 2006: 58). 
What we consider silence is largely dependent on our expectations of what was supposed 
to happen, but also over what period of time, how fast (Muñoz 2014: 20).
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Based on Bruneau’s typology (1973), and all other typologies which focus on the dura-
tion of silence, it is evident that the duration also depends on whether a particular silence 
is institutionally, group or individually determined, or non-interactive (Saville-Troike 1985: 
16–17). Using these criteria, linguist Muriel Saville-Troike consolidated twenty different 
types of silence with the conclusion that silences which involve a large number of partici-
pants, as well as those which are a result of conflict, generally last longer. Institutionally 
determined silences are also rarely short (ibid.).
Linguist Dennis Kurzon (2007) devised a more complex typology of silence in social 
interaction. He took into account the numerous factors which affect silence: the number of 
participants in the interaction, the identity of the text that is left unsaid, and the intentions 
of the silent individual. Based on these criteria, Kurzon differentiates between four types 
of silence: conversational silence, thematic silence, textual silence and situational silence. 
Although Kurzon’s focus is not on the duration of silence, he does point out that “three 
of the types of silence may be measured in time, while one – thematic silence – may 
be considered a metaphorical expansion of the term” (Kurzon 2007: 1687). By doing so, 
he identified the potential benefits of considering thematic silence within the broader 
social context, outside of specific cases of conversational interaction. Keeping in mind the 
duration of silence, we should examine conversational and thematic silence. According 
to Kurzon, conversational silence can manifest itself as the silent answer to a question 
or simply as the decision not to participate in the conversation. Its effect can be equal 
to that of speech, but it can also be a sign of subjugation. The text of such a silence is 
often unknown (Kurzon 2007: 1676). In the case of conversational silence, Kurzon be-
lieves, silence can be both intentional and unintentional,18 which implies that the potential 
speaker cannot, does not want to or is not allowed to speak. According to Kurzon, thematic 
silence is closely related to conversational silence because it often takes place in dialogical 
context (but can have external, broader social and cultural causes). The difference lies in 
the fact that, in conversational silence, there is a complete lack of verbalisation, whereas 
thematic silence still includes verbalisation, but what is being said is not related to the topic 
at hand (ibid.: 1677–1679). 
Kurzon’s point of differentiation – the fact that conversational silence lacks verbalisation 
and that thematic silence avoids the expected topic – should be taken with a grain of salt, 
especially because thematic silence is the only one which he claims cannot be measured 
temporally. Such a clear distinction between conversational and thematic silence cannot 
be that easily drawn. In the examples “Absolute Silence” and “Water Under the Bridge”, 
should we speak of conversational or thematic silence? In “Absolute Silence”, we can see 
that conversational silence can leave a verbal trace in the form of self-thematisation of 
one’s own silence (see the autopoiesis of silence earlier in the text), while still essentially 
being thematic silence. “Water Under the Bridge” can be seen as an example of conver-
sational silence (which can be measured chronometrically), but is also basically thematic 
18 Compare with the concept of “involuntary speechlessness” (Berger 2004). 
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silence which was not substituted with a different topic. Even though Kurzon’s typology 
took the duration of silence into consideration, we cannot consider his approach complete 
in the context of this paper. All the examples (including the aforementioned ones, but 
also, for example, “Tears” and “The Walk”), contain silences which can, in principle, be 
measured; however, these silences and acts of silencing have lasted for decades and 
involve a large number of people, even whole societies, no matter the extent to which 
personal experience is or is not thematised in such examples.
The definition given by historian Jay Winter takes a deeper view into the cultural, social 
and historical determination of silence in its individual and collective manifestations, 
emphasising its temporal aspect. According to Winter, silence is 
a socially constructed space in which and about which subjects and words normally 
used in everyday life are not spoken. The circle around this space is described by groups 
of people who at one point in time deem it appropriate that there is a difference between 
the sayable and the unsayable, or the spoken and the unspoken, and that such a distinc-
tion can and should be maintained and observed over time. Such people codify and 
enforce norms which reinforce the injunction against breaking into the inner space of 
the circle of silence. (Winter 2010: 4, emphasis J. M.)
His definition goes beyond the narrow linguistic view and considers silence not just at 
the level of individual expressions but also at the level of social relations, which are, es-
sentially, the sum of an array of concrete practices of omission, silence and silence-based 
communication. Defined in this way, silence presupposes the existence of a long period of 
time for its constitution and maintenance, even though it can be temporally measured in 
specific interactions. 
3.1.3.1. Long-lasting silence: minimalist forms and extensive narratives
The duration of silence cannot be considered directly correlated to the “size” of the utter-
ance or the narrative complexity of the story. Long-lasting silences which weigh as a heavy 
burden over whole communities can manifest themselves at the microlevel as minimalist, 
concise and synecdochal narrative forms in which the largest part remains unsaid; as we 
have seen before, they can also be realised in the private environment as “minimalist” 
and “synecdochal” everyday non-narrative practices and reminders of being in silence 
connected to experiences of fear, loss and trauma. However, long-lasting silences can 
also manifest themselves as “garrulous” silences in which speech conceals the topic or 
perspective expected by the recipient.
In states of acute fear, we often remain silent because we want to avoid the object of 
fear, run away or take up the smallest (verbal) space. “In fear, the world presses against 
the body; the body shrinks back from the world in the desire to avoid the object of fear. […] 
Such shrinkage is significant: fear works to contain some bodies such that they take up less 
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space. In this way, emotions work to align bodily space with social space” (Ahmed 2014: 
69). In “The Son”, Tamara describes a narrated event in which her son, the protagonist of 
the story, has a physical reaction to fear and experiences fear with minimal movement in 
silence. As the intensity of fear decreases and time goes on (as we become more adapted 
to its unpleasant effects), talking about it becomes a possibility (in “The Son” this happens 
from the perspective of a witness). 
To say “silence is golden” means to tell a story in a literary-minimalist sense. According 
to literary scholar Josip Užarević (2012), one of the basic structural-poetic determinants 
of (oral) literary minimalism is binomiality. He believes that the essence of a phenom-
enon is not found in the maximum number of its features but in its necessary, existential 
minimum. Two words, Užarević claims, can create a whole world. They “can function as 
a complete language, i.e. a medium through which complex messages can be moulded, 
transmitted and stored (archived)” (Užarević 2012: 52). In other words, to say “there were 
pits before, so there will be pits again”, as in the example “Pits” (or with even less words: 
“pits once, pits again”), does not necessarily mean that something was left out from the 
narrative. In Lotman’s words: this could be the finite model of an infinite world (Lotman 
1970: 256 in Užarević 2012: 33). In this way, language constructs the relationship between 
itself and reality (ibid.: 28). A narrative about fear or narration in fear, therefore, do not need 
more than two words. A story about fear can be just one or two years which are somehow 
related. Some years function as synecdochal stories. These years stand for complex 
historical nodes in which numerous fears and terrifying stories are both accumulated and 
left untold. The fear which stands out the most is the fear of history repeating itself, the 
fear that the year as a narrative will repeat itself. When a year is understood to be a nar-
rative, every narrator will find a different repertoire in it; however, they will share the same 
object of fear which is usually predetermined. In place of complex historical nodes, we can 
sometimes also find just one terrifying war narrative or personal experience. Their effect 
supports the idea of history repeating itself. History is, in that sense, alive. It lives in every 
open wound, as Ahmed says (2014: 33).
“The Pub” and “History”, although different, can be seen as examples of the so-called 
“garrulous” silence. Marija refused to adhere to the topic of the conversation, but still 
expressed her gratitude for the opportunity which she did not take; Goran avoided speak-
ing about the personal perspective of a historical experience. In both of these examples, 
we can safely conclude that both silences are long-lasting, but different strategies were 
used to deal with them. What brings them together is the large amount of speech in the 
conversational encounter. In her book The Silence: How Tragedy Shapes Talk (2002), 
Ruth Wajnryb states that the focus on the political and historical aspects of a traumatic 
experience is actually a substitute for the personal, i.e. that personal feelings are managed 
by speaking about politics and history. Any attempt to create a space for talking about 
the personal aspect of tragic events would make the conversation totter and eventually 
collapse (Wajnryb 2002: 30). Goran, despite his initial caution, did not hide his politi-
cal perspective and personal valorisation of history; however, he completely omitted his 
personal experience, even though it was reflected and hinted at in the “grand narrative”.
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3.1.4. Actors of silence: private and/or imposed silence?
From the narrow linguistic focus on silence in specific interactions, the perspective even-
tually expanded to include silences characteristic of powerless or silenced groups (e.g. 
Langton 1993; Houston and Kramarae 1991; Jaworski and Galasiński 2000), the discur-
sive, affective, cultural and social practices of silencing (e.g. Thiesmeyer 2003, 2003a) 
and censorship (e.g. Anthonissen 2003, 2008; Jaworski and Galasiński 2000), forms of 
institutional silencing and social control (e.g. van Dijk 1993; Mumby 1993), conspiracies 
of silence (Zerubavel 2006), and so on. This broader perspective, in my view, raises one 
important question: is silence a choice and/or necessity for the individual as the actor in 
an interaction, or is it a choice and/or necessity for the individual as a member of a com-
munity? Put differently, the question could also be: should silence be seen as a private, 
personal choice or is it almost always imposed on the individual through the opinions and 
attitudes of others, even if the silence in question is a form of resistance?
Many authors see silence as a social construct at the level of conversational interactions 
between the speaker and the listener, as well as at the level of groups or society as a whole 
(cf. Fivush 2010; Winter 2010). In both cases, voice and silence are “negotiated, imposed, 
contested, and provided” (Fivush 2010: 89). Different forms of absence of communication 
at the level of specific interactions, as well as the level of collectives, can have the function 
of “protector, enabler and maintainer of that what matters” (Seljamaa and Siim 2016: 6).
Silences provoked by some inconvenient, painful, shameful, dangerous or traumatic 
memory can manifest themselves as the suppression of communication caused by exter-
nal factors such as social expectations, friction or pressure; however, it can also manifest 
itself as the resistance towards communication motivated by internal factors such as guilt, 
shame and (self-)protection. However, the internal and external factors of silence are often 
two sides of the same coin. Self-censorship, for example, is the act of denying oneself 
the opportunity for verbal expression, whether due to one’s concern for the feelings and 
opinions of others or due to fear of some form of punishment. Silence is rarely the result of 
an autonomous individual choice, i.e. a choice which would be made without some sort of 
external pressure affecting the narrative. Even in “Absolute Silence”, the example in which 
the speaking subject states that the thematic silence is their own choice, it is evident that 
a number of external forces are preventing their narrative from being told. The decision 
to voluntarily enter the zone of silence is often influenced by the decisions, opinions and 
attitudes of other people, i.e. it is often affected and directed by another discourse which 
silences. In that sense, silencing is closely linked to social and political judgements on what 
can and what cannot be thought or communicated. Consequently, silence in such cases 
is more like a reflection of one’s inability or one’s need to avoid “status anxiety” (de Botton 
2005), or the desire to achieve a less unfavourable social position, rather than being the 
result of personal choice. There are many discursive methods of silencing, but only some 
of them are coercive (cf. Jaworski 1993; Blommaert and Verschueren 1998). Lynn Thies-
meyer believes that silencing can create different forms of silence within a community 
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discourse: “unwanted silencing, complied-in silencing, even unrealised or […] self-imposed 
silencing” (Thiesmeyer 2003a: 2). However, in order to understand the silencing of specific 
discourses, we must consider not just how one discourse is imposed over another but also 
the social and discursive borders between “imposition, compliance, and self-silencing” 
(Thiesmeyer 2003a: 2). “[S]ilencing is discourse, working through language and operating 
within the structures of social norms and negotiations” (Thiesmeyer 2003a: 22).19
Cultural and literary theorist Stuart Sim believes that silence can sometimes, depending 
on its meaning within the discursive context, also be understood as the “site of social 
conflict” (2007: 13). Silence in the political sphere can be in the service of conflict man-
agement by preventing the escalation of verbal (but also physical) conflict, along with 
potentially increasing the inequality of opposing discourses and the existing social and 
symbolic inequalities. 
Silence and silencing discourses, therefore, also function as mechanisms for the 
production of hegemonic social relations. Silencing discourses are disseminated through 
various channels, e.g. the media and the education system. They are incorporated into ev-
eryday affective and narrative practices, publicly acceptable emotions and discourses (cf. 
Sue 2015; Sheriff 2000). In the background of these processes, we can sometimes find 
conspiracies of silence the function of which is to make “a group of people tacitly agree 
to outwardly ignore something of which they are all personally aware” (Zerubavel 2006: 
2). This type of silence serves to cover up issues in society which are known to everyone, 
but which should not be talked about. “Conspiracies of silence are all-encompassing; the 
topic is unmentionable at all levels of society and everyone is expected to maintain the 
silence” (Sue 2015: 116). 
Discourses have the power of silencing and exclusion over some forms of expression 
and knowledge, which also includes the ability to exclude Others. In doing so, there is no 
need for constant reminders of what happens to those who speak up; similarly, punish-
ments do not have to be meted out in every single instance. What lies at the centre of 
this concept is the fear of negotiating with and resisting the discourse which happens to 
be more powerful, dominant, accepted, louder; in such situations, the dominant discourse 
hesitates or outright refuses to reconsider its foundational tenets and values. 
Silencing is most effective if it is hidden, i.e. when it replaces what has been silenced 
with another discourse, or when it conceals and filters out undesirable content through 
19 Philosopher Rae Langton identified three possible levels at which silencing can occur (1993). At the 
most basic level, it occurs when members of a particular group are intimidated or believe that nobody will 
listen to them. They do not speak at all and they do not show signs of resistance due to fear, or they consider 
any attempt at resisting futile. In this case, the “speakers fail to perform even a locutionary act” (Langton 
1993: 315). Xavier Guillaume refers to this type of silence as “locutionary exclusion” (2018: 482). Langton 
refers to the second type of silencing as “perlocutionary frustration”. It occurs in situations when “people will 
speak, but what they say will fail to achieve the effects that they intend: such speakers fail to perform their 
intended perlocutionary act” (Langton 1993: 315). Langton refers to the third type of silencing as “illocution-
ary disablement”, and it occurs “when one speaks, one utters words, and fails not simply to achieve the effect 
one aims at, but fails to perform the very action one intends” (Langton 1993: 315).
188
NU 57/1, 2020. pp 163–195JELENA MARKOVIĆ | THE SILENCE OF FEAR…
an acceptable, or simply more acceptable, discourse. Those who are silent are familiar 
with the attitudes, interpretations and values of the dominant discourse and they adjust 
to it, whether by choosing not to speak, challenging the dominant discourse or resisting it 
through speech or silence. 
3.1.4.1. Silences of/in the academia
Zerubavel refers to silence as the “soft” version of a taboo (2006: 29) and points out 
that what we avoid or ignore as members of society is also what we avoid and ignore 
as researchers (2006: 13). In the academia, fear and anxiety manifested in the form of 
“silenced” or restrained scientific work and academic writing stem from the collective 
imaginary of fear and the collective conspiracies of silence, which seep into the academic 
domain from everyday life. Nevertheless, I believe that some silences in academic text 
should not be discussed in the context of the author’s personal lack of courage or respon-
sibility; instead, I prefer to see them as an ethically and epistemologically justified and ef-
fective inhibition through which the authorial subject can partially identify with the subject 
of their research: namely, fear and taboo. Therefore, entering the “zones of fear” drives 
the researcher towards the same strategies of concealment which they normally witness 
in everyday life. Academic language is also the part of language which “evades” com-
munication, the ability to contain it and create distance between the subject of research 
(fear) and its articulation. In this process, the researcher, much like their interlocutors, is 
often confronted with the agony and inability of not being able to articulate their own or 
another person’s fear. 
Our writing about silence is, on the one hand, a kind of colonisation of the silence of 
our interlocutors (Freund 2013: 235), seeing that it grants insight into knowledge which is 
undiscussable, unmentionable, and untellable. On the other hand, as researchers, we are 
aware that places of silence are sometimes the only possible spaces of (academic) free-
dom. Political theorist Wendy Brown is critical of “the practice of compulsory discursivity” 
in a time of “diarrhetic speech and publication” (2005/1998: 95) and believes that we 
should resist the notion of “the presumed evil of silences” (ibid.: 85). In this context, she 
suggests that we reconsider the relationship between silence and the lack of power, and 
that we start seeing the capacity to be silent as “the measure of our desire for freedom” 
(ibid.: 96). 
In the academic field, freedom is not absolute. This field is sometimes a “dangerous” 
space that cannot absorb all the voices which could claim a right to it. To be completely 
honest, no matter how much we would like to believe otherwise, the academia often 
encourages the production of acceptable over critical discourses, along with supporting 
only those topics and approaches deemed “proper” (cf. Thiesmeyer 2003a: 9). This is 
why I believe Brown is right when she relates silence to freedom: the freedom to be able 
to reveal just enough to satisfy both our need to resist silence and our need for silence. I 
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would say that this was also what my interlocutors did. Seeing that the fieldwork was well-
prepared and that there were no major inhibitions or personal distrust, the interlocutors 
largely satisfied their need to resist silence (sometimes in the confessional form, which 
also brought them relief), while also transferring onto my colleagues and me the burden 
of their need to leave a part out within a low-risk context. Both the researcher and their 
interlocutors are aware that research itself does not have the magic ability to effortlessly 
surmount long-lasting, complex walls of silence, or to somehow relegate them to a “dan-
gerous” place without affective, sociocultural and political consequences. 
Some interlocutors gave their own vision of how the things which where concealed and 
silenced in their stories could be studied and presented, i.e. their own idea of how the gap 
between these two discourses – that of the silenced and the one doing the silencing – 
could be bridged. One interlocutor suggested the following: 
Miro: These [horrors of war and the post-war period previously described] are visible 
things. Whatever you show, these are visible things. So, they can be seen. But the worst 
is what cannot be seen. And I think that you, the people who do this type of job, should 
probably work on revealing the invisible rather than visible things. You only confirm, this 
is this. But what lies behind it? Why is there such a system in place? […] There is no big 
picture, just microspace. […] Starting from the big picture, you can’t… You can’t look at 
the big picture because you can’t perceive all of it. However, I can look at microspace 
and use that to explain the big picture. There’s no other way to do it. Try to approach a 
problem from the side. You won’t tackle it head-on. No way.
The same interlocutor even expressed his concern for me since I had now heard his “ter-
rifying” story. He believes, much like Zerubavel, that those who break the silence often do 
not fare well because “they disturb our cognitive tranquillity” (Zerubavel 2006: 74). 
Miro: How you will manage that, I don’t know. You will have to find a way not to get hurt. 
What would they say in Zagreb if you revealed all of this? […] I’m not sure if it should be 
up to you to raise all of these questions. […] Somebody will take notice and hint that you 
switch to a different topic. 
Studying the narrations of fear in post-conflict societies in no way excludes situations 
where one encounters topics which society does not allow to be discussed, i.e. topics which 
Hirschauer characterises as unmentionable (Hirschauer 2006: 425–426). By transferring 
unmentionable knowledge onto the researcher, the burden of the prohibited is also trans-
ferred (although I am not sure that the quest for that which is not spoken about is in itself 
viewed with much approval). These are narratives which drag all of those involved into 
an unsafe space. They cannot be simply transposed into academic discourse by invoking 
academic responsibility and freedom. Stefan Hirschauer decides to take the middle road 
by stating that the best measure for ethnographically describing what is unmentionable 
should be “just enough to leave room for […] imagination” (Hirschauer 2006: 426).
There is something naive and childish in concealment in academic texts. Readers of 
academic papers are trained to “read” what was concealed in such texts. The position 
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of a researcher who opts for concealment reminds me of a child who hides by covering 
their eyes, thinking that others will not be able to see them. This ludic element makes the 
researcher a liminal figure in the field of speech/silence. In ideal circumstances, research-
ers should enable a mobility to marginalised discourses recorded in the field. However, in 
post-conflict societies, this idea should be thoroughly reconsidered, seeing that these are 
definitely far from ideal circumstances. 
Translated by Armin Protulipac
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ŠUTNJA STRAHA, STRAHOM UTIŠANO I STRAH OD ŠUTNJE
Iako je rad zamišljen kao teorijski prilog razumijevanju različitih praksi šutnje koje su 
povezane s poviješću konflikta i nasilja, on se temelji na istraživanju koje je provedeno 
u Lici, hrvatskoj regiji koju autorica prepoznaje kao lokalitet koji je rezervoar strahova, 
anksioznosti, trauma i njima pripadajućih šutnji s dugom povijesti. Osim što šutnja ima 
različite funkcije i učinke, ona ima i vrlo raznoliku trajnost (može se mjeriti sekundama, 
ali i desetljećima), može biti i često jest popunjena drugim potencijalno komunikabilnim 
neverbalnim aspektima (emocijama i afektima, gestama, zvukovima i sl.) te može biti 
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više ili manje ovisna o mišljenjima, iskustvima i stavovima drugih pojedinaca i zajed-
nica te upravljana njima. Ukratko, u tekstu se šutnje zabilježene tijekom istraživanja 
promatraju u okviru brojnih tipologija šutnje te se pomnije razmatraju kontekstualno 
ovisni i ambivalentni učinci šutnje, njezine “praznine”, trajanje i njezini akteri (pojedinci i 
zajednice). U tekstu se raspravlja o šutnjama i utišavanjima na makrorazini te njihovim 
afektivnim i društvenim funkcijama kao i o njihovim učincima na mikrorazini u interper-
sonalnim interakcijama i svakodnevnom životu, etnografskim susretima. Raspravlja se i 
o reperkusijama mreže šutnji na javnu prezentaciju rezultata istraživanja šutnje.
Ključne riječi: šutnja, strah, anksioznost, tipologije šutnje, “praznina” šutnje, trajanje šutnje, 
akteri šutnje
